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Response

The Social and Cultural Aspects of
Climate Change Winners
Robin Kundis Craig

†

INTRODUCTION
In The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, Professor J.B. Ruhl does the academic and policy debate over climate change much benefit by raising the issue of climate
1
change winners. As he acknowledges, discussing the fact that
some—perhaps many—people will benefit from climate change,
at least in the short run, is often considered distasteful or polit2
ically incorrect. Nevertheless, every major cultural shift, geopolitical event, and natural disaster—and climate change rationally can be compared to all three—has created both winners
and losers, regardless of how happy observers might be about
3
that fact. During the eighteenth century’s French Revolution,
heads rolled and nobles fled, but many others came to power as
4
a result, Robespierre and Napoleon among them. Similar sto-

† William H. Leary Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney
College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT. The author may be reached at robin
.craig@law.utah.edu. Copyright © 2013 by Robin Kundis Craig.
1. J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97
MINN. L. REV. 206, 207 (2012).
2. See id. at 209.
3. See id. at 232; see also A GLOBALIZING WORLD? CULTURE, ECONOMICS,
POLITICS 90–96 (David Held ed., 2d ed. 2004) (discussing how the cultural
shift toward globalization has created winners and losers); Frédéric Bozo,
“Winners” and “Losers”: France, the United States, and the End of the Cold
War, 33 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 927, 927–31 (2009) (reviewing history’s attempts
to define winners and losers after the Cold War); Joseph Scanlon, Winners and
Losers: Some Thoughts About the Political Economy of Disaster, 6 INT’L J.
MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 47, 47–50 (1988) (discussing theories that
suggest that natural disasters can have winners and losers).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. DUIKER & JACKSON J. SPEILVOGEL, WORLD HISTORY 532–40 (6th ed. 2010) (providing a general background on the rise and
fall of both Robespierre and Napoleon).
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ries could be told about the twentieth century’s Communist
5
revolutions in Russia and China.
Beyond political figures, moreover, societies have long recognized that wars also produce private winners and private
6
losers beyond the soldiers on the battlefields. However, wheth7
er those private winners get labeled “war profiteers” or “war
8
heroes” depends as much on cultural constructions of their
meaning and public relations as on actual differences in their
motives and actions. To use an example from the American
Revolutionary War, the difference between a privateer and a
pirate is often in the eye of the person writing the history
9
books.
To expect that climate change will be different is sheer folly. Climate change is altering the basic conditions of the most
fundamental physical, chemical, and biological processes that
support life on earth, including human societies and the ecosystems upon which they depend (collectively, socio-ecological sys10
tems or SESs). As Professor Ruhl aptly describes, some localities will generally profit from these shifts even as others
(arguably most, especially as climate change progresses) be11
come steadily or abruptly worse off. Similarly, even within
communities that are generally worse off because of climate
change, some individuals and businesses are still likely to bene12
fit—again, at least in the short run. Climate change winners,
5. See generally S.A. SMITH, REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLE IN RUSSIA
CHINA: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY 192–235 (2008) (providing a background
of the Communist revolutions in Russia and China).
6. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 252 (briefly noting that some people will attempt to benefit from wars).
7. For a recent example of such labeling, see Ryan, The 25 Most Vicious
Iraq War Profiteers, BUS. PUNDIT (July 22, 2008, 5:02 PM), http://www
.businesspundit.com/the-25-most-vicious-iraq-war-profiteers/.
8. See, e.g., Fred Andrews, American Industry as War Hero, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2012, at BU5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/
business/in-freedoms-forge-us-industry-as-war-hero-review.html?_r=0 (reviewing ARTHUR HERMAN, FREEDOM’S FORGE (2012), which argues that American
business and industry won World War II).
9. See, e.g., Jesse Lemisch, Privateering, the American Revolution, and
the Rules of War: The United States Was Born in “Terrorism” and Piracy, GEO.
MASON U. HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 19, 2002, 7:11 PM), http://hnn.us/
articles/915.html.
10. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 9, 10–14, 23–27 (2010).
11. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 207–08.
12. Id. at 259–60.
AND
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in other words, will emerge at all scales—nations, regions,
13
communities, businesses and industries, and individuals.
Professor Ruhl quite consciously limits the focus of his
analysis primarily to individuals and, to a lesser degree, busi14
nesses and industries. Moreover, he also consciously chooses
to focus on the direct implications of self-defining climate
15
change winners for climate change policy itself. I highlight
these choices not because I find fault with them but instead
merely to point out that Professor Ruhl has deliberately chosen
to limit the contours of his examination, a completely rational
decision in light of the fact that his is the critical first foray into
this controversial subject.
Moreover, I agree with Professor Ruhl’s recommendations
for climate change law and policy. Climate change mitigation
efforts cannot afford to be held hostage by the—I’m betting—
comparatively small percentage of (let’s not forget to emphasize) relatively short-term climate change winners, at the expense of what will likely be billions more people who will be losing their homes, water, food, economic productivity, political
stability, cultural identity, health, and lives as a consequence of
climate change impacts. Nor should we forget, as Professor
Ruhl also notes, that too much indulging of climate change
winners could come at the expense of ultimately disastrous
long-term consequences for the planet as a whole—the consequences that are predicted if humans do not change course with
16
respect to climate change mitigation. Similarly, Professor
Ruhl is quite right to suggest that policymakers should try to
do everything possible to harness the energy and capital (economic and political) that climate change winners are likely to
generate in favor of beneficial “no regrets” climate change ad17
aptation strategies. As several scholars, including myself,
have emphasized, climate change adaptation is a much differ18
ent legal and policy problem than climate change mitigation.
13. Id. at 213.
14. See, e.g., id. at 231 (using the term “climate change winner” to refer to
“people and businesses”).
15. Id. at 241.
16. See id. at 257–69 (making recommendations for climate change mitigation policies).
17. See id. at 269–72 (detailing recommendations for climate change adaptation policies).
18. See Craig, supra note 10, at 15–18, 28–40; see also, e.g., Daniel H.
Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1, 2–3, 7–9 (2008) (comparing mitigation and adaptation as economic
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Climate change mitigation has a known, if politically excruciating, solution—reduce the total concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere by reducing anthropogenic emissions
19
of those gases. It also has a limited number of potential policy
vehicles for achieving those goals: command-and-control regulation of greenhouse gas emissions; cap-and-trade programs for
greenhouse gas emissions; carbon taxes; geoengineering efforts
(probably the most controversial of the options); or some com20
bination thereof. Climate change adaptation, in contrast, requires continually evolving strategies to cope with continually
changing locally and regionally specific socio-ecological condi21
tions. Colorado’s adaptation measures for dealing with pine
22
beetle infestations will not help Floridians coping with sealevel rise and saltwater intrusion into critical aquifers used for
23
water supply. Indeed, even adaptation strategies for sea-level
rise will need to vary from location to location, depending on
how fast the sea is rising, the exact combination of sea-level
rise, pre-existing climate change impacts (permafrost melting
in Alaska, changing ocean currents in Oregon, more severe
problems); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends
Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 60–66 (2010)
(comparing mitigation and adaptation law and politics); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 270–74 (2012) (discussing many of the differences in approach between climate change mitigation and climate change
adaptation); Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L.
309, 319–25 (2012) (distinguishing adaptation responses from mitigation responses in the context of human rights); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L.
363, 365–76 (2010) (providing a brief history of adaptation and mitigation policy focuses in the United States); Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting
to Climate Change While Planning for Disaster: Footholds, Rope Lines, and the
Iowa Floods, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2203, 2209–10 (distinguishing adaptation and
mitigation).
19. See Craig, supra note 10, at 28 (characterizing climate change mitigation as a relatively simple legal problem, albeit quite challenging politically).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 71–72.
22. See generally D.A. LEATHERMAN ET AL., COLO. STATE UNIV., MOUNTAIN PINE BEETLE (2007), available at http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/
insect/05528.pdf (discussing effects of and control measures for the pine beetle).
23. See generally Ryan Wiedenman, Adaptive Response Planning for SeaLevel Rise and Saltwater Intrusion in Miami-Dade County (Spring 2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State University), available at http://www.coss
.fsu.edu/durp/sites/coss.fsu.edu.durp/files/DIR_Weidenman_woAppendix.pdf
(discussing adaptation measures for sea-level rise and saltwater intrusion).
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storms in the Gulf of Mexico), and the number of immediately
vulnerable coastal amenities in a particular location (village
stability, energy infrastructure, water supply, fish stocks, coral
24
reefs, navigation).
Thus, I do not disagree with Professor Ruhl’s initial focus
on climate change policy or his analysis of the likely tendencies
of self-defining climate change “winners” and policy responses
to them. Nevertheless, there are social and cultural dimensions
that will shape the phenomenon of climate change “winners,”
and the social meaning of being a climate change beneficiary is
likely to vary from context to context or place to place. Moreover, as social-meaning scholars have long recognized, these social and cultural constructions are equally likely to influence
law and policy—and, indeed, will probably have broad legal and
25
political influence. As Lawrence Lessig recognized in 1995 (in
a very different context), the process of social construction and
the construction of social meaning are the sources of “real” social orthodoxy—the constructions and meanings that law either
26
works from or acts to change.
Recognition of social construction in the context of climate
change beneficiaries adds two important additional considerations when evaluating the issue of climate change winners.
First, as noted, Professor Ruhl assumes that climate change
“winners” will be, in the most important legal sense, largely

24. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on SeaLevel Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L.
REV. 521, 522–24 (2010) (discussing the need for adaptive management strategies for sea-level rise in part because of its unpredictability).
25. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 919, 920, 921–58 (2001) (discussing how changing social meaning can alter constitutional analysis in the context of school vouchers); Rosanna Lillian Langer, Dissertation Abstract, Law and Social Meaning: Defining
Rights and Wrongs Through Administrative Processing, 42 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 701, 706–07 (2004) (examining how the various social meanings of alleged
violations of Canadian domestic human rights laws get sorted out legally in
administrative processes); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?:
Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4, 62–77 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated a feminist approach into the social meaning of urine
testing of pregnant women by concluding that such testing was an ordinary
criminal search requiring probable cause and a warrant rather than a routine
administrative search).
26. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943, 946–47 (1995).
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self-defining. However, inevitably, the social meaning of climate change beneficiaries will also be socially constructed.
Moreover, because climate change is new and because, in the
United States at least, governments have been slow to create
28
and implement climate change policies, those social constructions of the various categories of climate change beneficiaries
are likely to substantially influence how people within those
categories are treated legally. As a result, what it will mean—
socially, culturally, politically, and legally—to be a climate
change beneficiary will almost certainly not be within the complete (or even substantial) control of the individual beneficiaries themselves. There are, after all, many ways to “win”—as a
result of blind, dumb luck; Pyrrhically; through innate talent;
by cheating; by successfully eliminating (through legitimate
competition or Mafia-style) one’s opponents or competitors;
through hard work and determination; or by successfully exploiting others. Likely, the reader had different visceral reactions to each entry on this list. Similarly, how a particular
community perceives, constructs, and categorizes climate
change beneficiaries could have social, political, and legal ramifications that ripple far beyond climate change policy. As such,
the first issue that this Essay explores is the wide variety of potential social constructions of climate change beneficiaries and
the potential ramifications of those classifications.
Professor Ruhl’s excellent article also implicitly assumes
that all persons and entities are venturing into the climate
change era with roughly equivalent social and political status29
es. But, of course, that’s not true. Thus, the second issue that
this Essay ponders is: What happens to climate change and
other policies if the culturally defined “wrong” people emerge as
climate change “winners”? Of course, the social reactions and
constructed social meanings will not be, at least not entirely
and probably not substantially, the kind of direct and conscious
policy choices that Professor Ruhl advocates. They are also not
the same kind of rational and self-serving political motivations
that Professor Ruhl reasonably posits for self-identifying cli30
mate change winners. Nevertheless, these cultural reactions
27. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 235 (“What we should care about . . . are
people and businesses who believe they are better off economically as a result of
climate change.” (emphasis added)).
28. See Craig, supra note 10, at 27.
29. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 232–35.
30. See id. at 242–47 (laying out his assumptions regarding how such selfidentifying winners will act).
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to and constructions of climate change beneficiaries are likely
to become political forces in their own right, rational or irrational as they may be. They may also, under the right circumstances, lead to extra-legal movements, riots, deals, protests,
marches, sit-ins, non-governmental organization (NGO) creations, vigilantism, or, in short, the whole gamut of American
responses to unpopular, outrageous, or “unfair” socioeconomic
circumstances and change. We do not have to look backwards
very far to identify the abilities of these impulses to influence
31
politics and law; the 2007–2008 mortgage and 2008–2009 fi32
nancial crises prompted not only policy and legal responses
33
34
but also the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street movements/protests, underscoring one of the biggest cultural35
political divides in U.S. history.
I. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
WINNERS
So, what are some of the possible social constructions of
climate change winners? Let’s start with the group that is
probably most likely to slip under the cultural/political radar—

31. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282–
300 (2008) (discussing the history of the subprime mortgage crisis).
32. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html (discussing many of the causes of the
financial crisis).
33. See, e.g., About Us, TEA PARTY, http://teaparty.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (describing the party’s principles). While the Tea Party itself traces its origins to the original Boston Tea Party in the American Revolution, id., most commentators date the Tea Party’s modern creation to February
2009 and Rick Santelli’s rant against the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. E.g., Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the
Tea Party Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1807, 1813 (2011) (“[T]he movement
began on February 19, 2009, when financial analyst Rick Santelli denounced
an Obama Administration proposal . . . .”); Ryan D. Murphy, Tea Party Constitutionalism: Does the “Astroturf” Have Roots in the History of the Constitution?, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 187 (2012) (“On February 19, 2009, the
Tea Party was born.”).
34. See, e.g., About, OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (describing the goals of the movement).
35. See, e.g., David Horsey, America’s Political Divide Is Turning into a
Chasm, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/06/
nation/la-na-tt-political-divide-20120605 (“When it comes to American politics,
the stark distinctions are actually increasing.”).
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36

Professor Ruhl’s passive climate change winners, who may
cause no cultural or political ripples at all. The farmer who
does a bit better because of warming temperatures may not be
perceptually all that different from a farmer who has a bumper
crop during (and because of) an El Niño or La Niña climate
37
event. Similarly, the farmer who changes crops in response to
changing climatic conditions and water supply may not be all
that different from a farmer who switched to growing corn for
38
ethanol in response to government subsidies. The farmer is
still a farmer, the changes she made are “natural”—what any
rational human being would do—and nobody seems directly
harmed by those choices.
More interesting will be the emerging cultural constructions of the “big splash” climate change beneficiaries—the people and entities who are obviously and, in some sense, non39
passively benefitting from climate change’s impacts. First, of
course, the relevant communities might basically agree with
the beneficiaries that they are, in fact, climate change “winners.” If so, the social meaning of being a climate change beneficiary will likely reinforce those beneficiaries’ selfidentifications as positive “winners” and, logically, those winners’ attitudes about climate change policy—the issue upon
which Professor Ruhl focuses.
Even so, however, “winners” come in several flavors. For
example, climate change winners might be culturally constructed as “just lucky,” on par with lottery or slot machine
winners. Even though “just lucky” is at base a positive social
construction, it carries with it an implication of lack of dessert
or moral justification: “lucky” climate change “winners” didn’t
particularly deserve the benefits they got, even if they can’t be
blamed for how they came to benefit. As such, a “just lucky” social construction could easily have political and legal consequences, particularly with respect to governments’ willingness
36. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 228 (describing passive climate change
winners).
37. See NOAA’s El Niño Page, NOAA, http://www.elnino.noaa.gov/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2013) (briefly describing the impacts of the two phases of the
oscillation).
38. Bloomberg View, Nearly Half of Corn Devoted to Fuel Production Despite Historic Drought, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/17/ethanol-mandate_n_1799046.html
(detailing the history of ethanol subsidies’ effects on crop planting).
39. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 228–31 (describing a variety of these nonpassive winners).
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to engage in wealth or benefit redistribution. As Forbes has
pointed out, the federal government is more than happy to tax
lump-sum lottery winnings at the highest possible income tax
rate, while only seven states do not tax them—and five of those
40
don’t have a state income tax in the first place. In the 2012
presidential election campaigns, the two candidates’ tax poli41
cies were vigorously and widely debated. Neither candidate,
however, debated whether truly “just lucky” winners—lottery
winners, successful gamblers—should be taxed. Instead, the
most contested tax debates are often focused on categories of
wealth generation that resonate through multiple social constructions which, in turn, generate a multiplicity of social
meanings that affect the appropriateness of greater or lesser
taxation, such as transfers of wealthy estates to younger gen42
erations and capital gains. Are estate taxes double-dipping
“death taxes” or a fair contribution to society from “undeserving
trust fund brats”? Are capital gains taxes too low, allowing the
already wealthy to generate income without “really” working,
or are they unfair burdens on the capitalists who drive the economic well-being of our society? Whichever way the reader
comes out on these debates, the debates themselves would be
much more intelligible if we all acknowledged that there are at
least two social constructions of the people involved and their
activities—embedded social meanings that inform the perceptions of fairness and reasonableness that underlie the formation of tax policy.
Similarly, even if climate change beneficiaries are socially
constructed as “winners,” exactly how they are constructed will
probably influence what is expected of them, both legally and
socially. “Just lucky” climate change beneficiaries should expect
to pay more taxes, rationally or irrationally, than “diligent,
hardworking visionaries” who had the foresight to make
40. Janet Novack, How Much Tax Will You Owe On $640 Million Jackpot?, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
janetnovack/2012/03/30/how-much-tax-will-you-owe-on-540-million-jackpot/.
41. See, e.g., Toni Nitti, Tax Aspects of the Obama-Romney Debate, Round
2, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
anthonynitti/2012/10/17/reactions-to-the-obama-romney-debate-round-2/.
42. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, The Great American Tax Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/
business/the-great-american-tax-debate.html (highlighting the disagreement
in America on whether the wealthy pay appropriate tax rates); Scott Horsley,
Paris Hilton vs. Death Tax: A Lesser-Known Fiscal Debate, NPR (Dec. 11,
2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/11/166989049/
paris-hilton-tax-vs-death-tax-a-lesser-known-fiscal-debate.
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“shrewd” (however risky at the time) choices and investments.
Conversely, irresponsible behavior may be more widely tolerated from people who receive climate change “windfalls” than
from people who become constructed as “community leaders in
climate change,” from whom community service and philanthropy are likely to be expected.
More important for this Essay, however, is the likelihood
that at least some climate change beneficiaries may find themselves socially constructed to be social, political, and, ultimately, legal “losers.” Equally important, such social constructions
of beneficiaries as “bad,” “unfair,” or even “criminal” may often
turn on cultural/political happenstance, unpredictable in advance, rather than on rational policy choices. As noted, whether
someone is a “pirate” or a “privateer” may depend entirely on
the exact cultural/political context from which that person’s actions are judged rather than on a rational categorization of the
activities themselves—but the legal consequences for the per43
son being so categorized still can be enormous (death versus
44
lucrative rewards ).
To complicate such negative social constructions even further, persons profiting from social and economic circumstances
can resonate through several cultural valences simultaneously:
The “captains of industry” in nineteenth century America were
45
also “robber barons.” Indeed, modern literature’s fascination
with the “anti-hero” consciously plays with the ambiguity and
46
fluidity of many social constructions. It is important to re43. See, e.g., Ex parte Gordon, 66 U.S. 503, 504–05, 1 Black 503, 504–05
(1860) (denying writ of certiorari to Gordon, who was convicted of piracy and
sentenced to death).
44. See, e.g., Aaron D. Simowitz, The Original Understanding of the Capture Clause, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 132–33 (2009) (discussing the profits and
rewards of privateers).
45. Indeed, this double resonation is so engrained in the story of American
history that it is taught as such to schoolchildren. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment
for the Humanities, The Industrial Age in America: Robber Barons and Captains of Industry, EDSITEMENT!, http://edsitement.neh.gov/lesson-plan/
industrial-age-america-robber-barons-and-captains-industry (last visited Mar.
4, 2013).
46. As one perhaps particularly apt example, in Alan Moore’s and Dave
Gibbons’s graphic novel (now also a movie) Watchmen, Adrian Veidt is both
the out-in-the-public superhero and the engineer of a fake global threat. See
ALAN MOORE & DAVE GIBBONS, WATCHMEN (1986). Veidt causes the deaths of
thousands (including, indirectly, the enigmatic but uncompromising Rorschach, who seeks to expose the truth even though he knows Armageddon will
ensue), from which he methodically earns a fortune while simultaneously uniting the planet in peace. See id.
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member, however, that such cultural ambiguity can still foster
legal developments: The abuses on the “robber baron” side of
the nineteenth century industrialists and monopolists led to
widespread legal reforms, from antitrust laws to worker protec47
tion laws to food purity laws.
So, what kinds of climate change beneficiaries might end
up being the “bad” (as culturally constructed) climate change
“winners”? If other contexts are any indication, one large subset
of this group will be people or entities that are perceived as
winning at the unfair expense of others. Water politics, for example, might end up being a particularly fertile breeding
ground for “bad” climate change “winners.” Stresses on water
supply are one of the most commonly predicted impacts of climate change; water is an absolute necessity for life and comfort
but water supply deals have always had a dark underbelly—see
48
Chinatown. Will the companies that champion desalination be
respected as savvy entrepreneurs or climate change’s version of
robber barons? What if water entrepreneurs in the West manage to negotiate deals and/or legislation to move Great Lakes
and Mississippi River water across the Continental Divide: Will
they be saviors or thieves? Or a little bit of both?
Geoengineers—especially the unsanctioned ones—are another potential category of “bad” climate change beneficiaries.
Consider, for example, The New York Times’s front-page story
on October 18, 2012, about California businessman Russ
George, who “chartered a fishing boat in July, loaded it with
100 tons of iron dust and cruised through Pacific waters off
western Canada, spewing his cargo into the sea in an ecological
experiment that has outraged scientists and government offi49
cials.” Although scientists and both the Canadian and United
States governments condemned the “experiment,” Mr. George
reported to the Times that
his team scattered iron dust several hundred miles west of the islands
of Haida Gwaii, in northern British Columbia, in exchange for $2.5
million from a native Canadian group. The iron spawned the growth
of enormous amounts of plankton, which Mr. George, a former fisheries and forestry worker, said might allow the project to meet one of its

47. See, e.g., 3 CLASS IN AMERICA 706–07 (Robert E. Weir ed., 2007) (noting some of the many laws passed to correct robber baron abuses).
48. CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974).
49. Henry Fountain, A Rogue Climate Experiment Outrages Scientists,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/19/science/earth/iron-dumping-experiment-in-pacific-alarms-marine
-experts.html?_r=0.
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goals: aiding the recovery of the local salmon fishery for the native
50
Haida.

Whether Mr. George and the native Haida group should be
considered misguided rogues, noble visionaries, or outright
criminals is an open question, but both were clearly seeking to
undo some of the impacts of climate change (ocean absorption
51
of carbon dioxide) for their own benefit. Moreover, it seems
clear that the social meaning that Mr. George and the native
Haida gave to the iron fertilization experiment differs from
both the social construction that scientists are imposing on it
and the legal significance that the affected governments are
seeking to establish under both domestic and international
52
law.
II. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE WINNERS
Now let’s consider, beyond the social construction problem,
how cultural responses to climate change beneficiaries might
also resonate (probably badly) with existing and sometimes
barely suppressed social tensions and divisions—tensions centered around political affiliation, social values, race, ethnicity,
social status, economic status, education, religion, and property
ownership. Or, as I put my question originally, what if the
“wrong” people visibly benefit from climate change?
I enter this discussion with one very important disclaimer:
I have no preconceived ideas of who the “wrong” people might
end up being, and in fact, I would predict that the “wrong” people will constitute different subgroups at different times and
places. The point is, rather, that we have existing social tensions that: (1) we have no reason to expect will disappear any
time soon; and (2) can be sparked periodically and often unexpectedly into social unrest and violence. Remember Rodney
53
King. We would be fools not to recognize that various aspects
of climate change impacts and climate change adaptation could
often resonate—again, probably badly—with those pre-existing
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Rodney King was the victim of a brutal beating at the hands of Los
Angeles police officers in 1991, and videos of the beating led to violent urban
riots across southern California. Joe Mozingo & Phil Willon, Rodney King Dies
at 47; Victim of Brutal Beating Became Reluctant Symbol of Race Relations,
L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/17/local/la-me
-0618-rodney-king-20120618. Mr. King died in June 2012. Id.
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tensions and prejudices. Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina
and Hurricane Sandy show us the many facets of human responses to bad situations, from heroism to selfless sharing to
desperation-driven mercy killings and abandonments to selfish
hoarding to violence to institutional neglect to “forgetting” of
54
certain, generally disadvantaged or minority, populations.
Climate change impacts will inevitably prompt a similar range
of human responses.
This recognition, too, should be part of the legal and policy
reaction to the fact that there will be climate change “winners.”
Certainly, as Professor Ruhl argues, climate change beneficiaries should not be able to claim property rights to support their
55
“winner” status. Conversely, they shouldn’t become the victims of hate crimes sparked by that status, either. Maybe we
already have the mechanisms and laws in place to deal adequately with social unrest sparked by identification of certain
groups as “unfair” or “undeserved” climate change winners—
but that’s not a conclusion we should reach without at least a
tad more thought. What happens, for example, if
poor/minority/unpopular communities currently situated on
subcoastal properties become waterfront owners as a result of
sea level rise and storm destruction of the former coast line?
Will their neighbors—especially the displaced former owners of
coastal property—peacefully allow them that new and at least
temporarily profitable status, or will there be calls for coastal
property re-distribution? Or will the social meaning of owning
coastal property have changed by then from a sign of wealth
and luxury to being stuck with continual expense and inundation? Conversely, what if new entrepreneurial responses to climate change impacts end up visibly concentrating extreme
wealth in the hands of a few while the surrounding community
suffers in climate change-induced abject poverty?
Neither law nor policy can possibly anticipate all of the
specific social and cultural reactions to climate change beneficiaries. However, they can anticipate that climate change impacts are likely to be destabilizing in at least some times and
places and that such destabilizations will likely be destructive
54. See, e.g., Hurricane Sandy: 3 Tales of Incredible Heroism, WEEK (Oct.
30, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/235600/hurricane-sandy-3-tales-of
-incredible-heroism; Trymaine Lee, Rumor to Fact in Tales of Post-Katrina Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A9, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/us/27racial.html?pagewanted=all.
55. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 272–73.
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more often than they are creative. Similarly, law and policy
can anticipate that at least some climate change beneficiaries
will be socially constructed to be “undeserving,” “exploitative,”
“bad actors,” or “criminal.” These social meanings may be neither fair nor legally accurate—or they may be both, depending
on what exactly the beneficiaries were doing to benefit from
climate change and how closely law hews to socially constructed meanings.
At the very least, therefore, we should be thinking about
the adequacy and bent of community leadership in the communities most likely to be particularly and predictably vulnerable
to the destabilizing pressures of climate change impacts, based
on some combination of existing tensions, destabilizing forces,
and severe and socially disorienting climate change impacts.
It’s also probably worth starting to think about climate change
adaptation assistance programs, climate change insurance regulation, climate change windfall taxation, and climate change
crimes. On the last subject, for example, it will undoubtedly be
difficult to define “climate change profiteering” specifically
enough to satisfy the demands of due process, although at least
57
we have the examples of war profiteering and securities profi58
teering to build on. I have no doubts, however, that climate
change profiteering will occur in the eyes of many, regardless of
whether such conduct is merely socially constructed to be morally offensive or actually made legally criminal.
CONCLUSION
In drawing attention to climate change “winners,” Professor Ruhl has opened legal, political, and social cans of worms
that implicate far more than just American climate change policy. As Americans construct various groups of climate change
beneficiaries as “winners,” “bad actors,” “natural,” “lucky,” “undeserving,” “entrepreneurial,” “visionary,” “heroic,” “exploitative,” “offensive,” “rogue,” “unjust,” “unfair,” or “criminal,” those
constructions will resonate in social interactions, in cultural
identity, in community stability, in political debate, and, ulti56. See Rymn J. Parsons, Climate Change: The Hottest Issue in Security
Studies?, 1 RISKS, HAZARDS & CRISIS PUB. POL’Y 87, 101–06 (2010).
57. See Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1211–1217 (1970)
(§§ 1211–1217 omitted from 2006 U.S. Code); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 337 (1942).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (regulating profits from the purchase
and sale of securities).
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mately, in law. Perhaps some would prefer not to wrestle with
these complexities, and there are good, pragmatic reasons that
Professor Ruhl begins with largely socially acontextual assumptions about how self-defined climate change “winners” will
behave.
Again, Professor Ruhl’s recommendations for U.S. climate
change policies are sound. Nevertheless, it is also important to
remember that climate change beneficiaries will not, in fact,
emerge acontextually; rather, their social meaning and political
and legal significance will be determined to a significant extent
through social construction, an intensely contextual and hence
difficult-to-predict process. The point here is not to try to impose precision on that process or to fix the outcomes, but rather
simply to emphasize two points. First, these social constructions and classifications of climate change beneficiaries are
likely to generate significant political and legal responses—
more, probably, than Professor Ruhl’s initial exhortation to recognize that climate change beneficiaries will exist in the first
place. Second, these social constructions are likely—in at least
some places and at least some times—to resonate in destabilizing ways with pre-existing social tensions and cultural fracture
lines.
Because climate change “winners” in many circumstances
may be more visible than the masses who are more invisibly
“muddling through” whatever climate change adaptation becomes necessary, climate change “winners” run the distinct risk
of becoming cultural lightning rods, for better or for worse. In
thinking about climate change beneficiaries, therefore, we need
to consider which kinds of beneficiaries the law should be seeking to constrain—and which kinds the law might need to protect.

